STEINER, HAECKEL  

AND  ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM

by Don Cruse (CANADA)

In his Philosophy of Freedom, Rudolf Steiner presents and defines the idea of ethical individualism as an alternative to codified morality. He tells us that true morality, and human freedom, arise not from our willingness to abide by moral codes, such as are the substance of much if not all religious teaching, but on our willingness, where necessary, to break those moral codes in the interest of a higher good. In his view the path to true morality becomes 'moral intuition' which is then made practical by 'moral inspiration' and put into effect with the aid of 'moral imagination.'

One does not need to look far in the modern world to find examples of this happening. In the book and movie Schindler's List, for example, the activities of many resistance groups during the second world war require the use of misdirection and outright deceitfulness in attempts to rescue Jews and other opponents of the Nazi terror in Europe from persecution. Also, in one of the great moral tales of our time, in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables, the Bishop when confronted at the door by two gendarmes, holding the arrested convict Jean Valjean between them, has the presence of mind to lie outright to the policemen, telling them that he had indeed given Valjean the stolen silver and asking why had he left behind the candlesticks he had also given him? This outright lie lays the foundation for a great moral drama, one in which evil often bears the face of law abidingness, and goodness of duplicity.

In Steiner's day, and to a large extent still today, religion uses its influence to establish prescribed codes of moral conduct, which in their effect amount to a denial of trust in the individual's right to freely choose, and to create a higher morality than is to be found in codes of ethical conduct, or in moral formulas like that attempted by Immanuel Kant's 'categorical imperative.' This tells us something of the immense significance for our human future of  Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom, in which there is also to be found the groundwork for an epistemological "monism of thought," a theory of knowledge totally opposed to materialistic science's prevailing monism of matter, but opposed also to the pervasive dualisms which were and largely still are the foundation of religious thought.

Steiner and Haeckel

Rudolf Steiner was writing his Philosophy of Freedom in Vienna during the final decade of the nineteenth century, the time in which he was also editing the scientific works of Goethe for both the 'Kurschner' and 'national' editions of Goethe's works. It was at this time, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that he came to know and then to publicly defend the work of Europe's most ardent Darwinist Ernst Haeckel, when like Darwin himself he came under severe attack from religious figures (see Steiner's three essays on 'Haeckel and His Opponents').

This was ironic to say the least, because Haeckel was a complete materialist, a 'mechanistic monist,' whereas the scientific works of Goethe, when combined with Steiner's epistemology, constitute not merely a vague idealism, which, like so much of religious thought first accepts the primacy of matter and then hovers impotently above it in the context of a cognitive dualism; instead it was the opposite cognitive monism to that espoused by Haekel. It claimed unequivocally that spirit was the primary reality and matter only its secondary by-product. How could it be, therefore, that Steiner could bring himself to so strongly support the work of Haeckel?

The two opposite monisms had one thing in common, they both strongly opposed dualism, that is to say they opposed any attempt to combine scientific and religious thought, but for totally opposite reasons. Haeckel, like materialistic science in general, opposed dualism because he believed that religion was merely superstition; Steiner because he contended that religious belief was no longer enough, and that in the future it would need to be replaced by a genuine 'science of the spirit. Nevertheless, this opposition to dualism gave them the appearance of a common cause.

The question then becomes: how are we to understand Steiner in this situation?

Darwinism

It needs to be remembered that at the time in question Darwinism was still in the early stages of its development, and that Steiner's birth in 1861 made him just two years younger than that theory. Throughout Steiner's later work also, there is the clear indication that human consciousness itself is evolving, and that a spiritual guidance underlies that evolution. Simply put, therefore, the Darwinian theory existed for a reason somehow connected with world destiny, and that it was a part of Steiner's task to understand that reason, even if he did not make that understanding public.

Looking at this situation a century later, it becomes clear that Darwinism was the means whereby science liberated itself from theology, becoming in the process the expression of a philosophic 'monism of matter,' which was of necessity opposed to any form of dualism, and especially of the form espoused by Rene Descartes.

This being the case, what was required of Steiner at that time? To understand this one needs to also understand that the existence of a second monism, one directly opposed in the direction of its causal logic to science's monism of matter, and moreover possessed of a sound epistemological foundation (see his doctorial thesis Truth and Knowledge, and his P of F), would in time prove fatal to Darwinism (anyone doubting this is invited to read the recently published work Evolution and the New Gnosis, by Robert Zimmer and myself), and that in Steiner's day it was far too early for this to happen. Perhaps he knew full well that this had to happen, and that his task was to allow it to happen at the right time, so that Darwinism might be given the opportunity to achieve its purpose. Then and only then could the inevitable conflict in causal logic between Steiner's monism of thought (spirit) and science's monism of matter become a matter of public knowledge and debate, In short a showdown between the two monisms could then begin in earnest.

Steiner expected a critical change to begin at the end of the twentieth century, and without identifying it, which would have defeated his purpose, he talks of a vital task to be accomplished at that time. Steiner speaks of an earthly gathering of the great Platonic teachers of Chartres, and of their pupils, planned to take place at the end of the 20th century. He describes this as an event of pivotal importance: "For then the great impulse will be given for a spiritual life on earth, without which earthly civilization would finally be drawn down into decadence..." (Karmic Relationships Vol. IV Lecture VI, p. 97).

We have now passed that date, so it is reasonable to ask who were the great Platonists, and what was the impulse they were entrusted to bring? To my mind it was to break the grip of the prevailing epistemological monism, but without resorting to dualism, and Owen Barfield was principal among their number. I also believe that Michael Polanyi was a Platonist, although during his lifetime he did not appear to make contact with Steiner's thought, except to the extent that he had read Owen Barfield. However, anyone comparing his approach to epistemology with Rudolf Steiner's, will find remarkable similarities. (see the article 'Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge' by Henry Barnes, in the SES Newsletter Vol. 18, No. 1 - 2002)..

Ethical Individualism

What was this later development and how was Steiner to facilitate it? The answer to this might reasonably be seen as the exercise on his part of a moral intuition — i.e. that he practice what he himself had so powerfully argued in his Philosophy of Freedom. It was too early, both in world history and in the early development of his own thought, to directly confront what was to become the Darwinian juggernaut. He therefore needed to act in a manner that would conceal, at least for a while, the still hidden logical opposition between Goethe's work and that of Darwin and Haeckel. To accomplish this he simply praised both world views, and neglected to mention their opposing causal logics. He then maintained a silence on this issue for the rest of his life—although he did leave strong but indefinite hints concerning it scattered throughout his later works.

At the time in question monism was still a comparatively new philosophic stance, when compared to the already long-established dualism of Descartes, and for Steiner to simply praise monism in general without distinguishing between its two opposite manifestations was a comparatively easy stage-one approach, although it required that he ignore a distinction that must have been obvious to him. Might this be regarded as the moral use of concealment? A deliberate act, like the examples cited above, which for reasons of world destiny needed to happen, so that it might be corrected when the time was right to do so? If this were the case, then it would surely be a justifiable use of Steiner's concept of moral intuition. It would have required a very conscious decision on his part, which would also have allowed him to anticipate stage-two, its correction at a  later date—and did he not often urge us to challenge his statements at all levels?

If this were an act inspired by moral imagination, then perhaps the time has now arrived for Steiner's thoughtful deed to be brought to fruition.